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Abstract This paper is devoted to the study of self-referential proofs and/or justi-
fications, i.e., valid proofs that prove statements about these same proofs. The goal
is to investigate whether such self-referential justifications are present in the rea-
soning described by standard modal epistemic logics such as S4. We argue that the
modal language by itself is too coarse to capture this concept of self-referentiality
and that the language of justification logic can serve as an adequate refinement. We
consider well-known modal logics of knowledge/belief and show, using explicit jus-
tifications, that S4, D4, K4, and T with their respective justification counterparts LP,
JD4, J4, and JT describe knowledge that is self-referential in some strong sense. We
also demonstrate that self-referentiality can be avoided for K and D.
In order to prove the former result, we develop a machinery of minimal evidence
functions used to effectively build models for justification logics. We observe that the
calculus used to construct the minimal functions axiomatizes the reflected fragments
of justification logics. We also discuss difficulties that result from an introduction of
negative introspection.
Keywords Self-referentiality · Justification logic · Epistemic modal logic · Logic of
Proofs
1 Introduction
The concept of self-reference, or self-referentiality, is a recurring topic in episte-
mology and beyond, with Cantor’s Diagonalization Method, Russell’s Paradox, and
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems being only a few examples where the phenom-
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enon manifests itself as an object under and/or a tool of investigation. Often self-
referentiality is used to demonstrate contradictions or paradoxes, for which reason it
is regarded with suspicion and conscious efforts are made to avoid it.
In the framework of formal epistemology, the first question to be clarified is what
kinds of self-referring objects are being considered. The case of self-referring sen-
tences in the context of Peano Arithmetic received a thorough treatment in [22].
Moreover, it turns out that many statements about self-reference can be formulated in
the modal language, where proofs, Gödel numbers, and the like are abstracted away
and concealed in the  of modal logic GL.
In this paper, we are also interested in self-referentiality in the context of proofs
or justifications, but the self-referring objects we study are proofs themselves.
Following Smoryn´sky, we use the term self-reference when talking about self-re-
ferring statements, whereas the term self-referentiality is reserved for proofs and is
the main object of study in this paper.
The question we are trying to answer can be broadly formulated as follows:
Do we normally use proofs that refer to themselves in mathematical discourse?
If so, can we eliminate such self-referential proofs: in a way, can we make
proofs predicative? If in general this is not possible, then which statements can
still be derived without the use of self-referentiality?
Naturally, to answer this question we need to narrow it down, leaving the general
discussion to philosophers. It should be clear that the answer strongly depends on the
context and in certain contexts can be trivial.
For instance, asking this question about proofs in Peano Arithmetic with the stan-
dard Gödel numbering leads to an easy negative answer. Indeed, the Gödel number
of a proof is always strictly greater than the Gödel numbers of any parts of the proven
statement. Therefore, a valid proof can never be present in the statement proven by
this proof.
In contrast, arguments understood in a broader sense as valid reasoning templates
or schemes suggest that we can apply them to anything including themselves. For
instance, a proof of the shortest tautology, F → F , in any formal system can certainly
be applied to any F even if it contains this very proof.
In provability logic, it makes sense to ask whether the use of self-referential proofs
is a necessary condition of validity for a particular theorem. Similarly, if one consid-
ers knowledge to be justified true belief (see, e.g., [10, 12, 13, 18]), it makes sense
to ask whether the use of self-referential justifications is necessary for a particular
epistemic fact to be valid. This question is hard to formulate within the confines of
the modal language although we have some vague intuitive understanding of its rele-
vance.
Example 1 Consider modal statement
 = ¬¬(P → P), (1)
638 Theory Comput Syst (2010) 46: 636–661
which is valid in epistemic modal logic S4, i.e., valid for a knowledge agent1 with
positive introspection. This formula intuitively says that it is impossible to know that
P does not imply the knowledge of P . Why? If the agent knew that P did not imply
the knowledge of P , then
(A) the agent would know that P must be true since otherwise false statement P
would imply anything, including P , and
(B) the agent would know that she does not know P since otherwise true state-
ment P would follow from anything, including P .
Knowledge is supposed to be factive, so the knowledge of her ignorance of P would
mean that the agent indeed would not know P . In summary, the agent would know P
without knowing it, a contradiction that shows the impossibility of the supposition
that the agent knows that P does not imply the knowledge of P , i.e., in formulas:
1. ¬(P → P) → P ;
2. ¬(P → P) → ¬P ;
3. ¬P → ¬P ;
4. ¬(P → P) → ¬P .
From 1. and 4., ¬¬(P → P) follows by propositional reasoning. There seems to
be a flavor of self-referentiality in this derivation. Indeed, the knowledge of P here
is derived from the knowledge of some fact, ¬(P → P), that involves P , the
knowledge of P .
Unfortunately, it is not always clear in the modal language whether this knowledge
and that knowledge of the same statement are, in fact, related. An exposition of this
phenomenon in Kripke’s Red Barn Example can be found in [3].
In Example 1, there is a reason to believe that self-referentiality does oc-
cur because the consequents of 1. and 4. have to be related in order to derive
¬¬(P → P). The consequent of 4. comes from the consequent of 3., which in
its turn follows from part of 3.’s antecedent. Finally, this antecedent, according to 2.,
is directly related to P inside the parenthesis.
We leave it to the reader to decide how persuasive this argument of the presence
of self-referentiality is. But even if it is, there is always a counterargument that there
may be another derivation that does not exploit self-referentiality.
This example shows that to study the impact of self-referentiality as a proof tech-
nique, we need a richer language that would allow for a finer analysis. In this paper,
we show that the language of justification logic (see [3]) fits the bill in many cases.
Instead of using statements F (there exists a proof of F ) wherein proofs are con-
cealed, justification logics employ the construct t :F (read term t serves as a justifi-
cation for or proof of F ) with proofs explicitly present, which greatly simplifies the
task of truth-tracking.
In the justification language, it is easy to see when self-referentiality occurs: when
a term t proves something about itself, i.e.,
 t :F(t). (2)
1A knowledge agent only knows true facts, unlike a belief agent whose beliefs can be false.
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This is the simplest but not the only type of self-referentiality; for instance, it could
happen that  t1 :F(t2) and  t2 :F(t1), with one proof referring to the other and
vice versa. We will discuss both the one-step, or direct, self-referentiality and the
multi-step one.
Before defining justification logics and plunging into technicalities, we have to
explain what effect our results about the justification language have on more familiar
epistemic modal logics, such as S4. There is a clear connection between the modal
language and the language with explicit justifications:
Definition 2 Forgetful projection ◦ turns each justification formula into a modal one
by replacing each occurrence of a justification term by , (t :G)◦ = (G◦), while
commuting with Boolean connectives, (F → G)◦ = F ◦ → G◦, and keeping sentence
letters and Boolean constants intact, P ◦ = P and ⊥◦ = ⊥.2
The forgetful projection of a set X of justification formulas is a set of modal for-
mulas X◦ = {F ◦ | F ∈ X}.
A logic L can be viewed as the set of L-theorems. Then, a modal logic ML is said
to be the forgetful projection of a justification logic JL if JL◦ = ML.
It was shown in [1] that the forgetful projection of the first justification logic, Logic
of Proofs LP, is exactly S4, i.e., LP◦ = S4 (see also [2]). This statement is typically
called the Realization Theorem and embodies two directions:
1. Replacing each justification term in an LP-theorem by  yields an S4-theorem.
2. Vice versa, it is possible to realize all occurrences of  in an S4-theorem by
justification terms in such a way that the resulting justification formula is valid.
This process of restoring terms hidden in ’s is called realization.
For each of modal logics K, D, T, K4, D4, S4, K5, K45, KD45, and S5, a justifi-
cation counterpart has been developed so that its forgetful projection is exactly this
modal logic (see [1, 3, 5, 20, 21]). In this respect, each of these justification logics is
a fair representation of its forgetful projection. So the role of self-referentiality in a
particular type of reasoning represented by a modal logic, say S4, can be investigated
through its justification counterpart, in this case LP.
Definition 3 We say that modal reasoning in a modal logic ML, as represented by its
justification counterpart JL, is not directly self-referential if each modal theorem G
of ML can be realized by a justification theorem Gr that can be derived in JL without
using any self-referential statements t :F(t).
The reasoning of ML and JL is not self-referential if the realization of each modal
theorem G can be achieved without using any cycles of references, such as
t2 :F1(t1), . . . , tn :Fn−1(tn−1), t1 :Fn(tn). (3)
2At this point, the structure of justification terms is not important since forgetful projection erases the
terms, structure notwithstanding. The structure of terms, which is the main truth-tracking tool, will be
discussed in detail in the next section.
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In this paper,3 we consider several representative examples and show that in all
the cases
– either direct self-referentiality is required already on the level of atomic justifica-
tions (S4/LP, D4/JD4, K4/J4, and T/JT)
– or self-referentiality can be avoided (K/J and D/JD).
Section 2 describes several justification logics and their forgetful projections. Epis-
temic semantics for the justification logics from Sect. 2, the so-called F-models, is de-
scribed in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we introduce ∗-calculi, an important tool for construct-
ing F-models. Using the ∗-calculi to construct F-countermodels, in Sect. 5 we prove
that the Realization Theorem for S4, D4, K4, and T requires direct self-referentiality.
Section 6 demonstrates how to avoid self-referentiality while realizing logics K and D.
In Sect. 7, we discuss the difficulties presented by negative introspection. Section 8
outlines directions for future research.
2 Justification Logics
The historically first justification logic, LP, was introduced in [1], where its forgetful
projection was shown to be S4 (see also [2]). Justification counterparts for K, D, T,
K4, and D4 were developed and the Realization Theorem for them was proved in [5].
The realizations of several modal logics with negative introspection were considered
in [3, 20, 21]. These logics with negative introspection present substantial difficulties
in applying our methods, which is discussed in detail in Sect. 7. In Sects. 2–6, we
focus on modal logics
K, D, T, K4, D4, S4 (4)
and their respective justification counterparts
J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP. (5)
The language of justification logic is that of propositional logic enriched by a new
construct t :F , where F is any formula and t is a justification term:
F ::= P | ⊥ | (F → F) | t :F,
t ::= ci | x | (t · t) | (t + t) | ! t,
where ci is a constant from a family of justification constants c1, c2, . . . , cn, . . .; x is
a justification variable; and P is a sentence letter. Constants from the same family
are denoted by the same letter with different integer indices; different families are
denoted by different letters. ! is a unary operation while + and · are binary operations
on terms.4
All the six justification logics from (5) share the following axioms and rules:
3An earlier version of this paper appeared in conference proceedings [17]. Results for S4/LP date back
to [4, 15].
4Operation ! is used only in J4, JD4, and LP.
Theory Comput Syst (2010) 46: 636–661 641
Table 1
Modal Justification Name of Is added
scheme scheme justification scheme in logics
F → F t :F → F A4. Factivity JT,LP
F → F t :F → ! t :(t :F) A5. Positive Introspection J4, JD4,LP
⊥ → ⊥ t :⊥ → ⊥ A7. Consistency JD, JD4
A1. Classical propositional axioms5 and rule modus ponens.
A2. Application Axiom s :(F → G) → (t :F → (s · t):G).
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s :F → (s + t):F , t :F → (s + t):F .
R4. Axiom Internalization Rule: cn :cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A , where A is an axiom, c1, . . . , cn
is an initial segment of a family of justification constants.
These axioms and rules alone yield the basic justification logic J, whose forgetful
projection is K, the weakest normal modal logic. It is easy to see that the forget-
ful projection of axioms of J yields theorems of K. Just like the other modal logics
from (4) are obtained by adding axiom schemes to K, so can their justification coun-
terparts from (5) be obtained by adding corresponding justification schemes to J. In
each case, the added modal axiom scheme is the forgetful projection of the respective
justification scheme (see Table 1).6 It is important to note that the modal Seriality
Axiom in the last row of the table is a single axiom, whereas its realization requires
an axiom scheme A7.
Theorem 4 (Realization Theorem) [1, 5]
J◦ = K, JD◦ = D, JT◦ = T,
J4◦ = K4, JD4◦ = D4, LP◦ = S4.
For each justification logic, a family of weaker logics with restricted rule R4 is
defined. Note that this rule has a different scope in different justification logics be-
cause they have different sets of axioms. Thus, the following definition of a constant
specification depends on the respective logic. In particular, a constant specification
for LP may not be a constant specification for J.
Definition 5 A constant specification CS for a justification logic JL is any set of
formulas cn :cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A that can be introduced by Axiom Internalization Rule R4
of this logic. The only requirement is for such a set to be downward closed, i.e., if
cn :cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A ∈ CS, then cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A ∈ CS.
5It is typically required that this axiomatization be arranged into finitely many axiom schemes, which
is necessary for decidability and complexity results. Since this additional requirement plays no role for
self-referentiality, we omit it here.
6Axiom and rule numbering is mostly inherited from [3].
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Definition 6 Let CS be a constant specification for a justification logic JL. By JLCS
we understand the logic obtained by replacing R4 in logic JL by rule
R4CS. Relativized Axiom Internalization Rule
cn :. . .:c1 :A ∈ CS
cn :. . .:c1 :A .
Each logic JL from (5) is essentially JLTCS with the total constant specification TCS:
TCS =
{
cn :. . .:c1 :A
∣∣∣∣ A is an axiom, c1, . . . , cn is an initial segmentof a family of justification constants
}
.
This will enable us to treat only the case of JLCS in future definitions, formulations,
and proofs and not to mention the case of JL explicitly since JL is an instance of JLCS.
Note 7 Justification logics with axiom A5, e.g., J4, JD4, and LP, allow for a simpler
formulation of rule R4, and consequently of a constant specification, of rule R4CS,
and of TCS:
R4′. Axiom Internalization Rule
c1 :A .
The purpose of rule R4 is to realize  . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
A for any n > 0 and any axiom A. Op-
erations on justifications take care of extending the realization to all theorems. But
axiom A5, together with rule R4′, enables us to use
! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c1 :. . .:! ! c1 :! c1 :c1 :A
for the same purpose. The two approaches are largely equivalent, where
cn  ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c1 provides a translation between them. Originally, all the six logics
from (5) were formulated with R4′ in [1, 2, 5]. The formulation in this paper fol-
lows [3].
Definition 8 A constant specification CS for a justification logic is called
– self-referential if {a1 :A1(bi1), b1 :A2(ci2), . . . , e1 :An(ain)} ⊆ CS, where a, b,
c, . . . , e represent families of constants and axioms Aj(dij ) must have at least
one occurrence of constant dij from family d ;
– directly self-referential if c1 :A(ci) ∈ CS;
– axiomatically appropriate7 if
1. every axiom A of the logic has at least one family of constants c such that
c1 :A ∈ CS; and
2. CS is upward closed, i.e., if cn :. . .:c1 :A ∈ CS, then cn+1 :cn :. . .:c1 :A ∈ CS.
7The term is due to Melvin Fitting (see [8]).
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These definitions of self-referential and directly self-referential CS use the down-
ward closure of constant specifications:
an :. . .:a1 :A(bi) ∈ CS 
⇒ a1 :A(bi) ∈ CS,
i.e., if family a refers to family b, this reference happens already on the level of a1, the
first constant in family a. So self-referentiality means the existence of a cycle of refer-
ences between families of constants, whereas direct self-referentiality requires some
family of constants to refer to itself. These two types of self-referentiality are atomic-
level manifestations of our general definition of (direct) self-referentiality from Defi-
nition 3. As it turns out, already this basic level is often necessary.
The following property is fundamental for justification logics and is an important
tool in proving the Realization Theorem.
Lemma 9 (Internalization Property) [1] Let JLCS be a justification logic with an ax-
iomatically appropriate CS. Then, for any derivation F1, . . . ,Fn JLCS B there exists
an evidence term s(x1, . . . , xn) such that
t1 :F1, . . . , tn :Fn JLCS s(t1, . . . , tn):B. (6)
Proof A step-by-step translation from the given derivation into the target one.
A  c1 :A (R4CS), where A is an axiom, the exis-
tence of c1 :A ∈ CS is guaranteed by ax-
iomatic appropriateness
Fi  ti :Fi (hypothesis)
cn :. . .:c1 :A  cn+1 :cn :. . .:c1 :A (R4CS), where cn : . . .:c1 :A ∈ CS, again
using axiomatic appropriateness
D → G D
G
 s1 :(D → G) s2 :D
(s1 · s2):G using A2 and modus ponens twice 
Total constant specification TCS is always directly self-referential. Therefore, the
standard proofs of the Realization Theorem from [2, 5] only show that realization is
possible when direct self-referentiality is used. Our first task is to determine when
realization cannot be achieved without (directly) self-referential CS. A relationship
to Definition 3 can be described by the following
Proposition 10 Let a modal logic ML be the forgetful projection of a justification
logic JL, i.e., JL◦ = ML.
1. If (JLCS)◦ = ML for any CS that is not directly self-referential, ML / JL describe
directly self-referential reasoning.
2. If (JLCS)◦ = ML for any CS that is not self-referential, ML / JL describe self-
referential reasoning.
3 Epistemic Models for Justification Logics
The self-referentiality of S4, D4, K4, and T is established by a semantic argument.
The Kripke-like models we use, epistemic F-models, were first developed by Fitting
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for LP. The proof of soundness and completeness of LP with respect to them, as well
as their adaptation to J, JT, and J4 can be found in [8]. Soundness and completeness
arguments for J and JD can be found in [20], for JT and J4 in [3]. The F-models
for JD4 are, perhaps, first developed here.
Definition 11 (F-models) An F-model is a quadruple M = 〈W,R, A,V 〉, where
〈W,R,V 〉 is a Kripke model with
– a set of worlds W = ∅,
– an accessibility relation R ⊆ W × W , and
– a valuation function V : SLet → 2W that assigns to a sentence letter P a set
V (P ) ⊆ W of all worlds where this sentence letter is deemed true.
Finally, an admissible evidence function A : Tm × Fm → 2W assigns to a pair of a
term t and a formula F a set A(t,F ) ⊆ W of all worlds where t is deemed admissible
evidence for F . Depending on the logic, there are various restrictions on the types
of R and A allowed. The following closure conditions must be satisfied by A for all
justification logics:
C2. A(t,F → G) ∩ A(s,F ) ⊆ A(t · s,G);
C3. A(t,F ) ∪ A(s,F ) ⊆ A(t + s,F );
CS. A(cn, cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A) = W , where n ≥ 1 and cn :cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A ∈ CS.
The forcing relation  is defined as follows:
– M,w  P iff w ∈ V (P ), where P is a sentence letter;
– Boolean cases are standard;
– M,w  t :F iff (1) M, u  F for all wRu and (2) w ∈ A(t,F ).
Closure conditions C2 and C3 are required to validate axioms A2 and A3 respectively,
which is reflected in their numbering. The additional conditions depend on the axioms
added to the logic:
– for JTCS and LPCS, axiom t :F → F requires that R be reflexive.
– For JDCS and JD4CS, axiom t :⊥ → ⊥ requires that R be serial.
– For J4CS, JD4CS, and LPCS, axiom t :F → ! t :t :F requires that R be transitive. In
addition, two more closure conditions are imposed on A:
C5. A(t,F ) ⊆ A(! t, t :F);
Monotonicity. wRu and w ∈ A(t,F ) imply u ∈ A(t,F ).
Note that w ∈ A(t,F ) in no way implies that F itself holds at w. Rather,
w ∈ A(t,F ) means that at world w term t is acceptable, although not necessarily
conclusive, evidence for F .
Just as we sometimes talk about an accessibility relation on W or a valuation
function on W without presenting the whole Kripke model, we will often deal with
admissible evidence functions without presenting a specific F-model. Note that due
to the Monotonicity Condition, to determine whether something is an admissible evi-
dence function, at least for some justification logics, we need to know both W and R;
hence, we will usually talk about admissible evidence functions on a given Kripke
frame 〈W,R〉.
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Theorem 12 (Completeness Theorem) [3, 8, 16, 20] Justification logics JCS, JTCS,
J4CS, and LPCS are sound and complete with respect to their F-models. JDCS and
JD4CS are sound with respect to their F-models; completeness also holds provided
CS is axiomatically appropriate.
Proof The proof is by the standard maximal consistent set construction. The com-
plete details can be found in [16]. 
The method we employ to prove direct self-referentiality consists of taking a
modal theorem, such as (1) or its variant for weaker logics, and showing that it cannot
be realized unless directly self-referential constants are used. To show the impossi-
bility, we take a possible realization and construct a countermodel for it under the
assumption that constants are not directly self-referential. So at the center of our
method is our ability to construct a model with given properties. The main challenge,
of course, lies in constructing the admissible evidence function with given proper-
ties since creating an underlying Kripke model is a routine procedure from modal
logic.
4 ∗-Calculi and Minimal Evidence Functions
The method for constructing the so-called minimal admissible evidence functions8
goes back to [19] but was first explicitly shaped as a calculus, for the case of LP,
in [14].
Definition 13 Let F = 〈W,R〉 be a Kripke frame. A possible evidence function on F
is any function B: Tm × Fm → 2W .
We will use possible evidence functions to formulate positive conditions on the ad-
missible evidence function we plan to construct: namely, to describe which terms
have to be evidence for which formulas. Note also that an admissible evidence func-
tion on F is, by definition, also a possible evidence function on F .
Definition 14 For a given Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉, we say that a possible evidence
function B2 on F is based on a possible evidence function B1, also on F , and write
B1 ⊆ B2 if B1(t,F ) ⊆ B2(t,F ) for any term t and any formula F .
Intuitively, B ⊆ A means that admissible evidence function A satisfies the positive
conditions set forth in B. The goal is typically to construct the minimal admissible
evidence function based on the given possible evidence function B:
Definition 15 Let B be a possible evidence function on a Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉.
The minimal admissible evidence function A based on B must satisfy two condi-
tions:
8Perhaps, it would be more accurate to call them the smallest admissible evidence functions, but the term
minimal has been traditionally used and we leave it here for the sake of consistency.
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1. it is based on B, i.e., B ⊆ A;
2. it is the smallest one, i.e., B ⊆ A′ 
⇒ A ⊆ A′ for any other admissible evidence
function A′ on the same Kripke frame.
Here are the axioms and rules of the calculi that describe minimal evidence func-
tions9. We collectively call the two types of axiom systems described below—∗CS
and ∗!CS—the ∗-calculi.
Definition 16 (∗-Calculi) Let CS be a constant specification for one of the justifi-
cation logics from (5). The axioms and rules of ∗CS-calculus for logics JCS, JDCS,
and JTCS are as follows:
∗CS. Axioms: ∗(cn, cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A), where n ≥ 1 and cn :cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A ∈ CS.
∗A2. Application Rule ∗(s,F → G) ∗ (t,F )∗(s · t,G) .
∗A3. Sum Rule ∗(s,F )∗(s + t,F ) ,
∗(t,F )
∗(s + t,F ) .
For the logics with positive introspection, J4CS, JD4CS, and LPCS, an additional
rule has to be added:
∗A5. Positive Introspection Rule ∗(t,F )∗(! t, t :F) .
The resulting calculus is called ∗!CS-calculus.
The Internalization Property can be reformulated for the ∗-calculi:
Lemma 17 (Internalization Property) Let JLCS be a justification logic from (5) with
an axiomatically appropriate CS. Then, for any derivation F1, . . . ,Fn JLCS B and
for the evidence term s(x1, . . . , xn) constructed for this derivation in Lemma 9,
∗(t1,F1), . . . ,∗(tn,Fn) ∗CS ∗(s(t1, . . . , tn),B). (7)
Proof The proof repeats that of Lemma 9, only (R4CS) in the target derivation should
be replaced by ∗CS, while A2 followed by double modus ponens becomes ∗A2. 
Note that neither ∗A3 nor ∗A5 is used in this proof. This is the reason we can use ∗CS
even for logics with positive introspection.
The converse statement does not hold for ∗!CS as the following example10 shows:
Example 18 ∗(x,P ) ∗!CS ∗(!x, x :P) for any CS, but surely P JLCS x :P .
9For brevity, we will sometimes omit the word admissible and call them minimal evidence functions.
10The example is due to Vladimir Krupski.
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But we can prove a weaker statement:
Lemma 19 For a justification logic JLCS with positive introspection, i.e., for J4CS,
JD4CS, and LPCS, if
∗(t1,F1), . . . ,∗(tn,Fn) ∗!CS ∗(s,B),
then
1. t1 :F1, . . . , tn :Fn, F1, . . . ,Fn JLCS s :B ,
2. t1 :F1, . . . , tn :Fn, F1, . . . ,Fn JLCS B .
Proof The proof of both claims is by simultaneous induction on the given ∗!CS-
derivation.
For ∗(cn,F ), an instance of ∗CS, it is clear that cn :F ∈ CS, where F is either
in CS (for n > 1) or an axiom (for n = 1). Thus, both cn :F and F are derivable
in JLCS.
For hypothesis ∗(ti ,Fi), both Fi (Claim 2) and ti :Fi (Claim 1) are taken as hy-
potheses in our JLCS-derivations.
If ∗(s1 · s2,G) is obtained by ∗A2 from ∗(s1,F → G) and ∗(s2,F ), then in JLCS
we can derive
1. (s1 · s2):G from s1 :(F → G) and s2 :F and
2. G from F → G and F .
The case of ∗A3 is similar to ∗A2.
Let ∗(! s1, s1 :F) be obtained from ∗(s1,F ) by ∗A5. Claim 1 for s1, which holds
by IH, happens to coincide with Claim 2 for ! s1: they both require that s1 :F be
derivable. Then Claim 1 for ! s1, i.e., derivability of ! s1 :s1 :F , can be inferred from
Claim 2 for ! s1 by means of positive introspection A5. 
Since in this proof, hypotheses ti :Fi are needed only for Claim 1, whose proof
interacts with the proof of Claim 2 only in the ∗A5-clause, and since ∗A5 is also the
only clause where positive introspection is used, it follows that for ∗CS the converse
of Lemma 17 holds:
Lemma 20 For a justification logic JLCS without positive introspection, i.e., for JCS,
JDCS, and JTCS, if
∗(t1,F1), . . . ,∗(tn,Fn) ∗CS ∗(s,B),
then
F1, . . . ,Fn JLCS B.
Corollary 21 For any JLCS ∈ {JCS, JDCS, JTCS, J4CS, JD4CS,LPCS} and its corre-
sponding ∗-calculus ∗,
∗ ∗(s,B) 
⇒ JLCS  B.
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In order to define minimal evidence functions in terms of the ∗-calculi, we use the
following piece of notation:
Definition 22 For a possible evidence function B on a Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉
and a world w ∈ W ,
B∗w = {∗(t,F ) | w ∈ B(t,F )}. (8)
So B∗w contains ∗(t,F ) iff w ∈ B(t,F ). In this sense ∗ can be seen as an abbreviation
for w ∈ B.
Theorem 23 Let B be a possible evidence function on a Kripke frame F = 〈W,R〉.
Define possible evidence function A as follows: for logics JCS, JDCS, and JTCS, let
∗(t,F ) ∈ A∗w ⇐⇒ B∗w ∗CS ∗(t,F ); (9)
for logics J4CS, JD4CS, and LPCS, we assume, in addition, that R is transitive and let
∗(t,F ) ∈ A∗w ⇐⇒ B∗w ∪
⋃
uRw
B∗u ∗!CS ∗(t,F ). (10)
For each of the six logics, A so defined is the minimal evidence function based on B.
Proof The ∗-calculi act locally, within each world, as do most closure conditions with
the exception of Monotonicity. Since B∗w is part of the set of hypotheses in both (9)
and (10), clearly B ⊆ A.
In both cases, A at each world is built from B at the same world by applying the
closure rules (in the equivalent form of ∗-calculus rules), which have to be satisfied
anyway. The additional hypotheses from B∗u in (10), where uRw, must be satisfied
at w due to the Monotonicity Condition: if u ∈ B(t,F ), then u ∈ E(t,F ) for any
admissible evidence function E based on B. It follows by the Monotonicity Condition
for E that w ∈ E(t,F ). So these additional hypotheses do not violate the minimality
of A.
It remains to show that A is, in fact, an admissible evidence function. Rules ∗A2,
∗A3, and ∗A5 guarantee that closure conditions C2, C3, and C5 respectively are sat-
isfied (note that ∗A5 is only used in (10), where C5 has to be satisfied). The axioms
from ∗CS similarly take care of the CS Closure Condition. The Monotonicity Con-
dition needs to be satisfied only when (10) is used. Let us show that w ∈ A(t,F )




B∗z ∗!CS ∗(t,F )
by definition of A. For these logics we assume R to be transitive, so zRu im-













B∗z ∗!CS ∗(t,F ),
i.e., w ∈ A(t,F ). 
It should be noted that, apart from being a method for constructing models, the
∗-calculi axiomatize the so-called reflected fragments of the respective justification
logics.
Definition 24 The reflected fragment rJLCS of a justification logic JLCS consists of
all its theorems of form t :F :
rJLCS = {t :F | JLCS  t :F }.
In fact, Nikolai Krupski in [14] introduced the ∗!-calculus11 to axiomatize rLP,
the reflected fragment of LP. His result can be extended to other logics as follows:
Theorem 25 [14, 16]
1. The reflected fragment rJLCS of JLCS ∈ {JCS, JDCS, JTCS} is completely axioma-
tized by the ∗CS-calculus:
rJLCS  t :F ⇐⇒ JLCS  t :F ⇐⇒ ∗CS-calculus  ∗(t,F ).
2. The reflected fragment rJLCS of JLCS ∈ {J4CS, JD4CS,LPCS} is completely axiom-
atized by the ∗!CS-calculus:
rJLCS  t :F ⇐⇒ JLCS  t :F ⇐⇒ ∗!CS-calculus  ∗(t,F ).
Proof (Sketch) In each case the middle statement is equivalent to the left one by
definition.
To derive the right statement from the left one, we use proof by contradiction.
Indeed, if  ∗(t,F ), then by Theorem 23 it would be possible to construct a model
with w /∈ A(t,F ) for some world w by taking A to be the minimal evidence function
based on the empty possible evidence function, B(t,F ) ≡ ∅. This world would then
falsify theorem t :F in violation of soundness.
Predictably, to get the left statement from the right one, completeness can be used.
If  ∗(t,F ), then JLCS  F by Corollary 21. Thus, F is valid by soundness. By The-
orem 23, it follows from  ∗(t,F ) that A(t,F ) = W for any admissible evidence
function A in any model. Therefore, t :F is valid and hence derivable by complete-
ness.
Full details of the proof can be found in [16]. 
Armed with minimal evidence functions as a tool for constructing F-models, we
are now ready to prove direct self-referentiality.
11Under the name of C(CS).
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5 Self-Referential Cases: S4, D4, T, and K4
Theorem 26 Realization of S4 in LP, of D4 in JD4, and of T in JT requires directly
self-referential constants and, hence, direct self-referentiality.
Proof Formula  = ¬¬(P → P) from (1) is derivable in all the three modal
logics: D4, T, and S4.12 Indeed, the S4-derivation from Example 1 (on p. 638) uses
only normal modal reasoning and the reflection axiom (in line 3). Hence, it can be
performed in T as is. Here is a similar derivation for D4:
1. ¬(P → P) → P (as in Example 1);
2. ¬(P → P) → ¬P (as in Example 1);
3. ¬(P → P) → (¬P → ⊥) (from 1. by propositional reasoning);
4. ¬(P → P) → (¬P → ⊥) (from 3. by normal modal reasoning);
5. ¬(P → P) → (¬P → ⊥) (from 4. by transitivity);
6. ¬(P → P) → (¬P → ⊥) (from 5. by seriality);
7. ¬(P → P) → ⊥ (from 6. and 2. by propositional reasoning).
The last formula is nothing but .
Our goal is to show that no potential realization of  can be valid in F-models
of JD4CS, JTCS, or LPCS respectively unless CS contains directly self-referential con-
stants.
Let JL ∈ {JD4, JT,LP} and CS be the maximal constant specification for JL with-
out directly self-referential constants:
CS =
{
cn :cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A
∣∣∣∣ A is an axiom of JL that does notcontain constants ci from family c
}
. (11)
For any pair of terms t and t ′ proposed as realizations of the two ’s in , we
construct an F-model for JLCS that falsifies ¬t :[¬(P → t ′ :P)], thus demonstrating
that no realization of  is JLCS-valid. Note that only the soundness of JLCS with
respect to its F-models is used in this argument. The additional condition for CS to
be axiomatically appropriate, necessary for completeness in case of JD4, thus plays
no role, even though it is, in fact, satisfied for the CS from (11).
Given t and t ′, consider the following F-model for JLCS: M = 〈W,R, A,V 〉
with the Kripke frame 〈W,R〉 that consists of a single reflexive world w, i.e., with
W = {w} and R = {〈w,w〉}. Such R is obviously serial, reflexive, and transitive, thus
making the frame suitable for JD4, JT, and LP alike. Since w is the only world in the
model, we can write
 F instead of M,w  F ,
A(s,F ) instead of w ∈ A(s,F ), and
¬A(s,F ) instead of w /∈ A(s,F ).
12The idea to use this formula for S4 was suggested by an anonymous referee of an earlier version of this
paper. Melvin Fitting then conjectured that it could also be used for the other two modal logics.
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Let us analyze what is needed to falsify ¬t :[¬(P → t ′ :P)] (at the only world in
the model). Clearly, it is sufficient to satisfy t : [¬(P → t ′ :P)]. So the first require-
ment on the model is that
A(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P)). (12)
In addition, ¬(P → t ′ :P) itself has to be true. This amounts to two requirements:
 P (13)
and  t ′ :P . In general, there are two ways to guarantee the latter: either by making
P false in one of the accessible worlds or by making t ′ not admissible as evidence
for P . In our case, the only accessible world is w itself, so (13) effectively prohibits
the first path. Thus, we must require
¬A(t ′,P ). (14)
Satisfying (12)–(14) is clearly sufficient for our purposes.
Let V (P ) = W = {w}, which takes care of (13). The truth values of the other
sentence letters are unimportant. Let B be a possible evidence function on 〈W,R〉
defined by
B∗w = {∗(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P))}, (15)
and let A be the minimal evidence function based on this B. (Note that A depends
on terms t and t ′.) This choice of A guarantees that (12) is satisfied, so it remains to
verify (14), i.e., according to (9) or (10), to show that
∗(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P)) ∗ ∗(t ′,P ) (16)
in the corresponding ∗-calculus. This is achieved by means of the following lemma:
Lemma 27 For any subterm s of term t ′:
1. If ∗ ∗(s,F ), then F does not contain occurrences of t ′.
2. If ∗(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P)) ∗ ∗(s,F ), but ∗ ∗(s,F ), then F has at least one occur-
rence of t ′. Moreover, if F is an implication, then F = ¬(P → t ′ :P).13
Here ∗ represents ∗CS in the case of JTCS or ∗!CS in the case of JD4CS and LPCS.
The proof of this lemma is rather technical and sheds little light on what is going
on. Let us first finish the proof of the theorem. The proof of the lemma can be found
below on p. 652.
Consider ∗(t ′,P ). JLCS  P , so by Corollary 21, ∗ ∗(s,P ). Further, since t ′ does
not occur in P , by Lemma 27.2, ∗(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P)) ∗ ∗(s,P ) either.
Thus, the constructed model satisfies (12)–(14) and, hence, falsifies the proposed
realization of (1). 
13We consider ¬G to be an abbreviation of G → ⊥. Assuming that ¬ is a primary connective would only
simplify matters.
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The technicalities in the formulation of Lemma 27 may obscure the fact that it is
nothing but a formal reformulation of the argument in Example 1. In fact, the example
was originally inspired by this lemma.
Lemma 17 helps to understand how (16) can be violated: if term t ′ encodes a
derivation ¬(P → t ′ :P) JLCS P . In this derivation, the hypothesis has to be used
because P is not valid on its own; this argument corresponds to Corollary 21. And
any meaningful way of using hypothesis ¬(P → t ′ :P) requires that it be part of an
axiom, which is represented in t ′ by a constant. This constant would justify the axiom
and, thus, would refer to t ′, at the same time being part of t ′. This is the essence of
the second claim of Lemma 27. The difference between the claims of Lemma 27
is the difference between using a hypothesis “in a meaningful way” (Claim 2) and
otherwise (Claim 1).
Proof of Lemma 27
(A) Case s = x, a justification variable:
∗(x,F ) can only be derived from ∗(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P)) and only if they coincide;
therefore, t = x and F = ¬(P → t ′ :P), which does contain t ′ and is the only
allowed implication.
(B) Case s = cn, a justification constant:
Unless ∗(cn,F ) coincides with the hypothesis as in 5, it can only be derived
by ∗CS, in which case cn :F ∈ CS and we are in the situation of Claim 1. Then,
either n = 1 and F = A or n > 1 and F = cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A, where A is an axiom.
Since CS is not directly self-referential, A cannot contain occurrences of cn,
a subterm of t ′, and neither can c1, . . . , cn−1. Thus, F does not contain t ′.
(C) Case s = ! s1 (only for logics JD4CS and LPCS):
Unless ∗(! s1,F ) coincides with the hypothesis as in 5, it can only be derived
by ∗A5 from ∗(s1,G) and only if F = s1 :G. If ∗(s1,G) is derivable without
the hypothesis (Claim 1), G does not contain t ′ by IH, whereas s1 is a proper
subterm of t ′. Therefore, F = s1 :G does not contain t ′.
If ∗(s1,G) can only be derived from the hypothesis (Claim 2), G contains t ′
by IH, and so does F = s1 :G, which is not an implication.
(D) Case s = s1 + s2:
Unless ∗(s1 + s2,F ) coincides with the hypothesis as in 5, it can only be derived
by ∗A3 from ∗(si ,F ) for some i = 1,2. Therefore, either claim for F holds
by IH.
(E) Case s = s1 · s2:
Unless ∗(s1 · s2,F ) coincides with the hypothesis as in 5, it can only be derived
by ∗A2 from ∗(s1,G → F) and ∗(s2,G) for some formula G. If both premises
can be derived without the hypothesis (Claim 1), then G → F does not contain t ′
by IH, and consequently neither does F .
It turns out that this is the only possibility. Indeed, if ∗(s2,G) is not derivable
without the hypothesis, G must contain t ′ by IH. Therefore, G → F also con-
tains t ′, and by IH ∗(s1,G → F) is not derivable without the hypothesis either.
Thus, whenever the hypothesis is needed at all, ∗(s1,G → F) definitely requires
it. Suppose it does. Being an implication, by IH
G → F = ¬(P → t ′ :P) = (P → t ′ :P) → ⊥
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must be the only implication allowed in Claim 2. So G = P → t ′ :P . Then
∗(s2,G) can only belong to Claim 2 because G contains t ′. However, G is an
implication other than the only one allowed by IH. This contradiction completes
the proof of 5. 
Theorem 28 Realization of K4 in J4 requires direct self-referentiality.
Proof Formula  from (1) is not derivable in K4 and thus cannot be used here. But
since the Hilbert-style axiom system for D4 is obtained from that of K4 by adding
just one axiom, Seriality, K4  ¬⊥ → ¬¬(P → P).14 We will show that its
equivalent form
 = ¬(P → P) → ⊥ (17)
cannot be realized in J4 without directly self-referential constants.
For any potential realization
r = t :[¬(P → t ′ :P)] → k :⊥, (18)
we construct an F-model for J4CS that falsifies r , thus showing that no realization
of  is J4CS-valid. As in Theorem 26, here CS is the maximal constant specification
without directly self-referential constants defined by (11) with JL = J4.
This time the frame in the falsifying model consists of a single irreflexive world,
i.e., W = {w}, R = ∅. In such a model, any F is vacuously true at all accessible
worlds. Therefore,  s :F iff A(s,F ). Once again, we take A to be the minimal
evidence function based on B defined by (15). (Note that R is not present in the
definition of B, so the fact that R used in Theorem 26 differs from the one used here
plays no role as long as W is the same.) Valuation V is not important.
Clearly, A(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P)), so to falsify (18) it is sufficient to show ¬A(k,⊥),
which, according to (10), is equivalent to
∗(t, ¬(P → t ′ :P)) ∗!CS ∗(k,⊥).
Suppose towards a contradiction that ∗(t, ¬(P → t ′ : P)) ∗!CS ∗(k,⊥). By
Lemma 19.2,
¬(P → t ′ :P), t :[¬(P → t ′ :P)] J4CS ⊥;
in other words, by soundness, the two hypotheses would not be J4CS-satisfiable. At
the same time, the F-model constructed in the proof of Theorem 26 for the case of LP
satisfies both of them. It remains to show that any LPCS′ -model is also a J4CS-model,
where CS′ stands for the maximal constant specification for LP that is not directly
self-referential, whereas CS is the respective maximal constant specification for J4.
LPCS′ -models also require that R be transitive and A satisfy closure conditions C2,
C3, C5, and Monotonicity. All axioms of J4 are also axioms of LP, and the defin-
ition of directly self-referential constants is logic independent, so CS ⊂ CS′. Thus,
14The idea to use this formula for K4 is due to Melvin Fitting.
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the ∗CS′-closure implies the ∗CS-closure. So the supposedly unsatisfiable formulas
have a model. This contradiction completes the proof. 
6 Non-Self-Referential Cases: D and K
In this section, we will show that (JDCS)◦ = D and (JCS)◦ = K for some non-self-
referential constant specifications CS. Moreover, we will make sure that no realiza-
tion of a modal theorem requires any self-referential cycles.
To construct such realizations, we divide both the set of constants and the set of
justification variables into levels indexed by non-negative integers as follows. Let
(ci) and (x) denote the level of constant ci and of variable x respectively. We
require that consecutive constants from the same family have consecutive levels:
(ci+1) = (ci) + 1. We also distribute constants and variables into levels in such
a way that for each non-negative integer i both set
{a1 | a is a family of constants and (a1) = i}
and set
{x | x is a justification variable and (x) = i}
are infinite.
Let At be the set of all atomic justification terms: constants and variables, and let
At(F ) and At(t) denote the sets of all atomic terms that occur in formula F and in
term t respectively. We extend the definition of level to terms and formulas as follows:
(t) = max{(p) | p ∈ At(t)}, (19)
(F ) = max{(p) | p ∈ At(F )}. (20)
If At(F ) = ∅, we define (F ) = 0. For instance, (P ) = 0 for any sentence letter P .
Let
CS = {cn :cn−1 :. . .:c1 :A ∈ TCSJL | (c1) > (A)} (21)
for JL ∈ {J, JD}. Such a constant specification is clearly axiomatically appropriate.
Theorem 29 It is possible to realize D in JD and K in J without self-referentiality.
Proof We reprove the Realization Theorem for D in JDCS and for K in JCS for the
respective CS from (21) making sure that whenever t :F appears in the derivation of
the realizing justification formula, (t) > (F ).
Since JLCS ⊆ JL, we have (JDCS)◦ ⊆ JD◦ = D and (JCS)◦ ⊆ J◦ = K, so it remains
to prove the other inclusion. Before doing so, we need to describe the behavior of ’s
in cut-free Gentzen derivations for logics K and D.15
15It was suggested by Valentin Shehtman that this property is due to uniformity of these modal logics. For
a discussion of uniform modal logics, see [6, 7].
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We take Gentzen calculus G3c from [23] for classical propositional logic, i.e., we
restrict the axioms to ⊥ ⇒ and P ⇒ P for sentence letters P .16 The only modal
rule to be added for logic K is
C1, . . . ,Cn ⇒ B
C1, . . . ,Cn ⇒ B . (22)
In addition, logic D enjoys
C1, . . . ,Cn,D ⇒
C1, . . . ,Cn,D ⇒ . (23)
(Gentzen rules necessary for various modal logics can be found, for instance, in [9,
25]. The system for D seems to originate from [11]. See also [24] for the exposition
of a syntactic cut-elimination for D, which subsumes the one for K since rule (22) is
present in D.)
We define the depth of an occurrence of  in a modal formula F by induction
on the size of F : the outer  in G has depth 0 in G; for any occurrence of 
inside G, its depth in G is obtained by adding 1 to its depth in G.
We now define the level of an occurrence of  in a Gentzen derivation as its depth
in the formula it occurs in plus the number of modal rules (22) and (23) used on its
branch after this occurrence.
All occurrences of  in a cut-free Gentzen derivation can be divided into families
of related occurrences. It is easy to prove that
Lemma 30 In a Gentzen K- or D-derivation of ⇒ G, the levels of all occurrences
of  from a given family are equal to the depth of the family’s occurrence in G.
Thus, we can define the level of a family of ’s. Moreover, it is fairly obvious that
all new ’s introduced by a particular instance of either (22) or (23) have the same
level, which enables us to define the level of a given instance of a modal rule.
Let N be the largest level of ’s in a given cut-free derivation.
We use a proof of the Realization Theorem that transforms a given cut-free
Gentzen derivation of a modal theorem G, i.e., of sequent ⇒ G, into a Hilbert deriva-
tion of its realization Gr by induction on the Gentzen derivation, whereby each se-
quent   ⇒  is being transformed into r  ∨r .17 A detailed description can
be found in [2, 4, 5]. Our approach here is different in that we realize ’s according
to their levels, which eventually enables us to avoid self-referentiality. We first de-
scribe the Realization Procedure along with level assignments. Then we show why
self-referentiality does not occur.
16In G3c Weakening and Contraction rules are absorbed into the axioms. Here it is more convenient to
have Weakening and Contraction present explicitly while keeping the axioms as plain as possible. This
allows for a greater control over where ’s are introduced. It is important nevertheless that the systems we
use be cut-free.
17As always, the empty disjunction is interpreted as ⊥.
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A cut-free derivation preserves the polarity of formulas, so we can divide families
of ’s into positive and negative. We realize each negative family by a distinct justi-
fication variable of level N − i, where i is the level of this family of ’s. The same
is done for the positive families that are introduced exclusively by Weakening. If at
least one  in a positive family is introduced by rule (22), such a family is realized by
a sum of auxiliary variables v1 + · · · + vl , one variable per each use of (22) to intro-
duce a  from this family. (Note that rule (23) does not introduce new positive ’s.)
These auxiliary variables are not real justification terms; they are placeholders to be
replaced by actual terms in the course of the realization. The level of each auxiliary
variable is also defined to be N − i, where i is the level of the respective instance
of (22), or equivalently the level of the family of ’s the variable temporarily real-
izes. Let us call this preliminary realization of ’s in the given Gentzen derivation a
prerealization. As will be seen later, the prerealization is only changed by instances
of modal rule (22).
The Gentzen axioms, propositional rules, and Contraction do not introduce any
new ’s and can be translated from Gentzen into Hilbert using the standard propo-
sitional translation methods. Since the reasoning involved is purely propositional,
there are no changes to the prerealization; in particular, no new terms or subformu-
las of type t :F appear anywhere in the Hilbert derivation under construction due to
Gentzen axioms or these rules.
Instances of Weakening can introduce formulas with ’s, so new terms (at least
new to this Gentzen branch) may have to be introduced. The realization of ’s in-
troduced by Weakening is done according to the prerealization, except that some
auxiliary variables might have already been replaced by real justification terms dur-
ing the translation of preceding modal rules. Since the reasoning needed to translate
instances of Weakening is also purely propositional, no new terms are introduced,
except those that realize new ’s, and no new subformulas of type t :F appear in the
Hilbert derivation, except those that realize new modal subformulas in the Gentzen
derivation.
Thus, changes to the prerealization can happen only when instances of modal
rules (22) and (23) are translated. To translate such instances, we use the Internal-
ization Property (Lemma 9). This prompts an appearance of terms and formulas of
type t :F in the Hilbert derivation that do not themselves realize any ’s and modal
formulas in the Gentzen derivation. Such terms may be subterms of realizing terms
or, as in the case of rule (23), terms may simply disappear from the final justification
formula and only remain present in the Hilbert derivation. Our goal is to show that
self-referentiality does not occur even in such “hidden” terms and formulas.
Consider rule (22) first. By IH, we already have a Hilbert derivation of
Cr1, . . . ,C
r
n  Br. (24)
By Lemma 9, there exists a term t (x1, . . . , xn) such that
x1 :Cr1, . . . , xn :Crn  t (x1, . . . , xn):Br, (25)
where each xi is the prerealization of the negative  in front of Ci in the conclusion
of (22). Throughout the Hilbert proof, we substitute t (x1, . . . , xn) for the auxiliary
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variable that corresponds to this instance of rule (22) in the sum realization of the
family of the  in front of B (in the conclusion of the modal rule). According to
the proof of Lemma 9, each axiom A in derivation (24) gives rise to a constant c1
in (25), to be taken from a fresh family of constants and used in c1 :A. Similarly,
each use of the Axiom Internalization Rule, ck : ck−1 : . . .:c1 :A, in (24) requires a
new constant ck+1, to be used in ck+1 :ck :ck−1 : . . .:c1 :A in (25), where naturally
ck+1 is taken from the same family of constants as c1, . . . , ck . In the latter case, the
level of ck+1 is predetermined by the level of ck . In the former case, we choose a
new constant so that (c1) = N − i, where i is the level of this instance of rule (22),
or equivalently the level of the family of the  in front of B . Each hypothesis Cri
in (24) acquires in (25) variable xi according to the prerealization. The level of these
variables is also N − i, where i is the level of this instance of (22). All the new
constants and variables become subterms of term t (x1, . . . , xn), which realizes the 
in front of B .
Rule (23) is treated similarly. Here the Internalization yields
x1 :Cr1, . . . , xn :Crn, y :Dr  t (x1, . . . , xn, y):⊥,
from which ⊥ can be easily derived by means of axiom A7, t (x1, . . . , xn, y):⊥ → ⊥,
and modus ponens. We use the same guidelines for assigning levels to new con-
stants c1 inside t (x1, . . . , xn, y) as the ones we used for rule (22) except that there
is no B and hence no  to be realized. But we can still use the level of the instance
of (23) to figure out the level of the new constants. Note that no change to the pre-
realization happens here: term t (x1, . . . , xn, y) simply disappears even though the
constants that comprise it remain in the Hilbert derivation. These are the “hidden”
constants referred to earlier. These constants, or rather constants from the same fam-
ily, can later be incorporated into terms to replace positive ’s in the subsequent
instances of rule (22).
We have chosen the level of each variable and auxiliary variable in the prereal-
ization to be equal to N − i, where i is the level of the family of ’s realized by
the respective (auxiliary) variable. We have made sure that this correspondence re-
mains valid for constants c1 introduced in the modal rules if those constants are used
in the realization of some positive . In instances of rule (23), the level has been
matched to that of the rule. It remains to verify that constants ck+1 introduced dur-
ing Internalizations also comply. It will then follow that the substitutions of a term
for an auxiliary variable in translating instances of (22) do not violate this preset
harmony. These substitutions are the source of self-referentiality in stronger modal
logics.
Let us prove that the level of ck+1 still matches the level of the rule that prompts its
introduction. Indeed, as we have seen, constants are only introduced to be used in Ax-
iom Internalizations. Each instance of Axiom Internalization remains in the Hilbert
derivation throughout the subsequent propositional Gentzen steps until an appear-
ance of the next instance of a modal rule because the translation of a propositional
Gentzen rule, logical or structural alike, only appends the existing Hilbert derivation.
Each constant c1 has level N − i by construction, where i is the level of the corre-
sponding instance of the modal rule. Suppose constants ck also satisfy this property.
Consider an instance of a modal rule whose translation has introduced constant ck+1.
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It gets introduced because ck had already been used in the Hilbert derivation. By IH,
the level of ck is equal to N − i, where i is the level of the instance of the rule that
introduces ck . (Note that every constant is introduced only once because we always
choose a fresh constant and substitutions do not influence the introduction of con-
stants, only of the formulas justified by these constants.) It is easy to observe that if
instance I2 of a modal rule follows instance I1 of a modal rule in a Gentzen derivation
with no other modal rules on the branch between them, then (I2) = (I1)− 1. Thus,
(ck+1) = (ck) + 1 = N − (I1) + 1 = N − (I2).
Therefore, whenever a term t replaces an auxiliary variable, this term consists
entirely of constants and variables whose level is N − i, where i is the level of the
family of ’s realized by t . The replaced auxiliary variable has the exact same level,
so substitutions do not change the level of any terms or formulas.
We now prove that whenever t :F appears in the translation, (t) > (F ) by in-
duction on the depth of the Gentzen derivation. As discussed before, we only need to
consider Gentzen steps corresponding to modal rules. Consider an instance I of a
modal rule of level i. All modal rules in the subtree whose root is the premise
of I and all ’s present in this subtree have levels strictly greater than i. There-
fore, all variables and constants in the Hilbert derivation of the realization of the
premise of I have levels strictly smaller than N − i (here we consider the final
form of the derivation after substitutions have replaced all auxiliary variables). So
all the formulas in the Hilbert derivation before Internalization have levels < N − i.
All the constants and variables introduced during Internalization have level N − i,
and so do all the new terms constructed by Internalization. Therefore, whenever for-
mula s :F appears in the internalized derivation, i.e., the derivation of the conclusion
of I, (s) = N − i > (F ) because F was present in the derivation before Internal-
ization (see proof of Lemma 9).
Demonstrating that self-referentiality does not occur is now easy. Suppose formu-
las
t2 :F1(t1), . . . , tm :Fm−1(tm−1), t1 :Fm(tm)
are present in the final Hilbert derivation. That would imply that
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(t2) > (F1(t1)) ≥ (t1),
...
(tm) > (Fm−1(tm−1)) ≥ (tm−1),
(t1) > (Fm(tm)) ≥ (tm).
In other words, we would have
(tm) > (tm−1) > · · · > (t2) > (t1) > (tm),
which is impossible.
We have shown that self-referentiality can be avoided in formulas that realize all
modal theorems of K and D, as well as in derivations of these realizing formulas. 
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7 What Is Wrong with Negative Introspection?
Modal logics with negative introspection K5, K45, KD45, and S5 also have their jus-
tification counterparts. These counterparts are obtained by adding a new unary oper-
ation ? on justification terms. The role of ? with respect to negative introspection is
similar to that of ! with respect to positive introspection. We discuss the difficulties in
expanding the study of self-referentiality to these logics using JT45, the counterpart
of S5, as a representative example.
JT45 is obtained from LP by adding
A6. Negative Introspection Axiom ¬t :F → ? t :¬t :F
(see [3, 20, 21]). It would seem that the argument from Example 1, which only re-
quires T reasoning, can therefore be performed in S5 equally well. This hints at the
self-referentiality of S5, which should be provable through terms of JT45.
However, this program is far from completion. Our method for demonstrating self-
referentiality for S4 and several other logics involves showing that the only way to
falsify ¬t :[¬(P → t ′ :P)] is by using directly self-referential constants. On the face
of it, this can be done in two ways. The first option is to analyze all possible deriva-
tions to show that they all feature self-referential constants. But studying the prop-
erties of Hilbert derivations is an unwieldy task given an absence of the subformula
property. So we resort to showing the contrapositive: we eliminate self-referential
constants and in their absence are able to construct a countermodel. In doing so we
rely on the existence of a minimal admissible evidence function such that for some
world w
w ∈ A(t,¬(P → t ′ :P)) but w /∈ A(t ′,P ).
Logic JT45 also has an epistemic semantics complete with admissible evidence
functions. They have to satisfy an additional closure condition
C5. [A(t,F )]c ⊆ A(? t, ¬t :F),
where [·]c means the complement within W . Unfortunately, all variants of F-models
for JT45 feature another requirement that proves to be non-recursive. Pacuit in [20]
imposes a condition that he calls Negative Proof Checker, which states: “If there is
a v such that wRv and M, v  ¬F [...], then w ∈ A(? t,¬t :F).” This condition is
non-constructive since A(? t, ·) is not determined solely by A(t, ·). It is not clear,
in particular, how to satisfy this condition if F contains ? t . Rubtsova in [21] and
Artemov in [3] replace this requirement by the so-called Strong Evidence property:
“if w ∈ A(t,F ), then M,w  t :F .”18 Although this condition looks a little nicer, it
is in fact equivalent to Pacuit’s condition and thus is as hard to satisfy. It also ties a
statement about admissible evidence w ∈ A(t,F ) to the truth of formula F at worlds
accessible from w, which is implied by w  t :F , thus violating the useful separation
of truth from admissible evidence in LP and weaker logics: the truth of formulas there
does not affect the admissibility of evidence.
18This formulation is from [3]; Rubtsova’s condition is almost identical. The term strong evidence is due
to Fitting and is a property of the canonical models for all justification logics.
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Still, a condition of such type is necessary for the validity of the Negative In-
trospection Axiom. Indeed, ¬t :F could be true simply because F is false in some
accessible world, which has nothing to do with whether t is admissible evidence. But
to validate ? t :¬t :F we must make ? t admissible evidence for ¬t :F . It seems that
a different semantics is needed to handle justification logics with negative introspec-
tion.
8 Future Research
There are many directions in which this study can be developed.
Self-referentiality results can be used to prove structural properties of Gentzen
modal derivations, e.g., the unavoidability of double introduction of the same family
of ’s on the same branch for directly self-referential modal logics. This opens new
applications of Justification Logic to structural proof theory.
It remains to see what triggers self-referentiality. It appears that self-referentiality
is tied to the possibility of mixing levels of ’s in a Gentzen derivation, to the non-
uniformity of a modal logic, but we need a larger sample set to make any definite
conclusions. We conjecture that the statement of Lemma 30 can be viewed as a purely
modal formulation of a sufficient criterion for non-self-referentiality. It would be in-
teresting to see whether it is also necessary.
We still do not know of an example when self-referentiality is required but direct
self-referentiality can be avoided.
A manageable semantics for logics with negative introspection could open a lot of
avenues into their study, including self-referentiality, decidability, complexity, etc.
Another direction is a deeper study of self-referentiality where it is unavoidable.19
Some modal theorems in, say, S4 can be realized without self-referentiality, e.g., all
theorems of D. What is the non-self-referential fragment of S4 and of other modal
logics? Are such fragments decidable? Do they have a nice axiomatization? Can these
fragments be constructed uniformly for different modal logics?
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